
research programs.
What is the focus of the RPCR?
Most markets are imperfectly competitive: they are characterized by advantages of being large, such as economies of scale, and/or differentiated products. This gives suppliers market power, the ability to profitably raise prices above competitive levels.
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Competition, or antitrust, laws are intended to prevent the creation, maintenance, or enhancement of market power through conduct that is inconsistent with competition, including mergers, price fixing, and monopolization.
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Regulatory economics identifies the rationale and how the state should control the exercise of market power through administrative control of pricing and entry.
The policy concerns of the RPCR are best illustrated by considering a few concrete, regulatory and competition questions shown below. These are questions that have been addressed in the past by members of the research team at RPCR; we expect that future research projects will address emerging questions relevant to the future.
Illustrative Regulatory Questions
Why, and should some pipelines be common carriers, where all shippers have equal rights of access; others are contract carriers, where shippers acquire capacity rights; and yet others are vertically integrated, where shippers own the pipeline?
When and how should the price, terms of service, and quality of pipelines be regulated?
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Why are oil pipelines within Alberta not regulated, whereas the Canada Energy Regulator exercises control over the tolls and facilities of some interprovincial pipelines?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of different institutional processes to set tolls on regulated pipelines? Alternative processes include:
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Negotiation between shippers and pipelines subject to approval by the regulator.
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Tolls set by the regulator to recover the cost of service?. Which costs?
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Tolls are fixed and do not vary with costs at least in the short -run, so-called price-cap or incentive regulation.
Why are there so many regulators involved in permitting interprovincial pipelines, including the Canada Energy Regulator and the Impact Assessment Agency, and what will be the effect of the Building Canada Act included in Bill C-5? What is the role of environmental impacts in permitting interprovincial pipelines and how should those impacts be addressed by regulation?
Why does the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission not regulate broadband services,—high-speed internet access—at retail, but does regulate the rates and terms of access for competitors to use competitors’ networks to provide service? Which competitors, which networks, at what prices? What are the costs and benefits of this kind of wholesale regulation? What are the complications associated with the regulated facility owner also providing services at retail?
Why is production of electricity in Alberta subject to limited price regulation, but transmission tolls are regulated? Why is there essentially free entry into production of electricity, except for renewables, but transmission facilities require regulatory approval? And unlike broadband, why are electricity producers prohibited from providing transmission?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of alternative regulatory institutions to control market power? Alternatives include:
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Oil pipelines are typically privately owned and controlled by a regulator.
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Water and sewage are often municipal services, provided by the local government, but not always.
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Airports and air traffic control are provided by non-profit authorities, created by legislation.
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Electricity service in some provinces is provided by crown corporations: unregulated firms owned by the government. Not just electricity service, but also ferry and postal service.
How does, and should, society convince firms to invest billions of dollars of capital in facilities—pipelines, transmission lines, broadband networks— that have essentially no alternative use?
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How is the risk that post-investment, regulatory and government policy will change to reduce the returns that justified the investment by either directly (regulating prices) or indirectly (e.g., by enhancing “competition”) lowering price eliminated or mitigated?
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What happens when the price set by the government is based on affordability considerations and not the cost of supply?
How should pharmaceutical prices be regulated in Canada? Generic drug prices are fixed based on the number of competitors: does that mechanism deliver good results?
Illustrative Competition Questions
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Why were Rogers and Shaw permitted to merge? Should they have been allowed to merge?
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Why, and should communication between gas stations over the price of gasoline be a criminal offence? Market-wide increases in the price of gasoline before a long weekend?
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Is Canada’s airline industry competitive?
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Should Google be allowed to operate an ad exchange (which matches demand by advertisers to place content on a webpage with the supply of available space on webpages by publishers) and software for publishers that manages their supply of space?
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Should Amazon be allowed to sell products that compete with other firms on the Amazon Marketplace?
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Should Apple be allowed to exclude apps from the App Store that would enable a competing app store?
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Should major junior hockey teams in Canada be able to restrict the ability of players they draft to play for other teams or other leagues?

Research and commentary on competition policy and regulation in Canada.
The emphasis is on developing a dialogue between policymakers, practitioners, and academics to improve the practice and policy of competition law enforcement and regulation. We will develop a network of engaged researchers and practitioners whose understanding and research agenda are informed by the concerns and needs of industry, regulators, and governments.
Key to the impact of the RPCR will be timely commentary on policy issues, as well as competition and regulatory cases in Canada.
Unique educational programs that allow for the development of expertise in regulatory economics and competition policy.
Unique educational programs that allow for the development of expertise in regulatory economics and competition policy. The anticipated programs include:
Continuing and expanding the Department of Economics’ Summer Internship in Regulatory Economics (SIRE): The SIRE program dates from 2000 and has proven to be a launch pad for a career as a professional economist. SIRE involves a carefully curated suite of courses and research experiences that develop expertise in industrial organization, competition policy, and regulatory economics, followed by a four-month paid internship.
Conferences: The RPCR will host conferences that will feature both industry and academic views on developments, issues, and challenges in regulatory economics. The intersection of academic study and analysis with industry is an important value added.
Professional Education: The RPCR will mount courses in regulatory issues, process, and economics intended for employees of regulated companies and regulators. These professional education courses are in the development stages and are anticipated to be offered in the next year to two years.

Research and commentary on competition policy and regulation in Canada.
The emphasis is on developing a dialogue between policymakers, practitioners, and academics to improve the practice and policy of competition law enforcement and regulation. We will develop a network of engaged researchers and practitioners whose understanding and research agenda are informed by the concerns and needs of industry, regulators, and governments.
Key to the impact of the RPCR will be timely commentary on policy issues, as well as competition and regulatory cases in Canada.
Unique educational programs that allow for the development of expertise in regulatory economics and competition policy.
Unique educational programs that allow for the development of expertise in regulatory economics and competition policy. The anticipated programs include:
Continuing and expanding the Department of Economics’ Summer Internship in Regulatory Economics (SIRE): The SIRE program dates from 2000 and has proven to be a launch pad for a career as a professional economist. SIRE involves a carefully curated suite of courses and research experiences that develop expertise in industrial organization, competition policy, and regulatory economics, followed by a four-month paid internship.
Conferences: The RPCR will host conferences that will feature both industry and academic views on developments, issues, and challenges in regulatory economics. The intersection of academic study and analysis with industry is an important value added.
Professional Education: The RPCR will mount courses in regulatory issues, process, and economics intended for employees of regulated companies and regulators. These professional education courses are in the development stages and are anticipated to be offered in the next year to two years.
Two piLlars
Our Initial Areas of Focus

Oil & Gas/Pipelines
Maximization of the potential of Canada’s oil and gas reserves depends on the capacity and tolling of the supporting pipeline network. The regulatory framework for pipelines is crucial for both efficient construction outcomes and capacity allocation.

Electricity
Within Canada, Alberta has a relatively unique reliance on private investment in electricity, with an emphasis on market governance within an appropriate regulatory framework, highlighting the importance of market design. With growing demand for power, the regulation of Alberta’s electricity market is becoming even more important to achieving market-oriented outcomes.


